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Of Truth, in Science and in Law 
Susan Haack† 
When Questions of Science Come to the Courtroom, Truth Has 
Many Faces 
—headline in the New York Times1 
I.  INTRODUCTION: FACTUAL TRUTH, SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, 
AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE  
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court averred that 
“[t]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.”2  
In 1993, in the landmark ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., that set new standards for the admis-
sibility of expert scientific testimony, Justice Blackmun was a 
bit more cautious, writing that “there are important differences 
between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for 
truth in the laboratory.”3  
In my view, however, a trial—even a trial at which the 
main issue is a matter of fact, such as whether it was the 
defendant or someone else who pulled the trigger, or whether  
it was the drug in question or something else that caused  
the injury—isn’t exactly a “search for truth.” Rather, a trial is 
better described as a late stage of a whole process of deter-
mining a defendant’s guilt or liability: the stage at which, 
under the legal guidance of the court, advocates for each side 
present evidence in the light most favorable to their case, and 
  
 † Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts 
and Sciences, Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Law, University of Miami. My 
thanks to Mark Migotti for helpful comments on a draft, and to Barbara Brandon and 
Mark Plotkin of the University of Miami Law Library for help in tracking down 
relevant materials. I also learned a good deal from discussions at a workshop held at 
Albany Law School in December 2006 on a forthcoming book by Wendy Wagner and 
Thomas McGarity (BENDING SCIENCE (forthcoming 2008)). 
 1 Cornelia Dean, When Questions of Science Come to a Courtroom, Truth Has 
Many Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at F3. 
 2 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
 3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597-97 (1993). 
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the finder of fact sifts through it and assesses whether it 
establishes guilt or liability to the required degree of proof.4  
Qua litigators, the attorneys for parties at trial are 
primarily engaged, not in inquiry, but in advocacy. And the 
whole process is constrained by legal desiderata which are not 
directly, or even not at all, truth-related: that defendants’ 
constitutional rights not be violated,5 that certain policy 
considerations (such as not discouraging landlords from 
making repairs that might prevent accidents)6 be served, and 
so on. Relevant evidence is thus sometimes excluded for 
reasons that have nothing to do with truth. Moreover, legal 
proceedings operate under a kind of time constraint alien to the 
search for truth in physics, history, and the rest. To quote 
Justice Blackmun again, the legal system seeks “quick, final 
and binding . . . judgments”;7 the desideratum of promptness 
imposes time constraints at one end of the process, the 
desideratum of finality-and-bindingness at the other.  
Nevertheless, truth is surely relevant to legal pro-
ceedings, for we want, not simply resolutions, but just 
resolutions; and substantial justice requires factual truth.8 In 
its efforts to arrive at factually correct verdicts, the legal 
system has come to rely a good deal on scientific experts, who 
by now testify on just about every scientific, and quasi-
scientific, subject imaginable: experts on blood, bullets, bite-
  
 4 Here and in the next paragraph I have drawn on an earlier paper of mine: 
Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 
AM. J. JURIS. 43, 50 (2004).  
 5 As the Supreme Court recognized in Tehan: “By contrast, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment 
of truth. . . . [but] stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values.” 
Tehan, 382 U.S. at 416. 
 6 FED. R. EVID. 407 (providing that “evidence of the subsequent [remedial] 
measures” is (normally) inadmissible; e.g., that the landlord subsequently fixed the 
steps on which the plaintiff fell and broke her leg cannot be introduced in arguing that 
the landlord’s negligence makes him liable for the injury).  
 7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 8 This principle has sometimes been deliberately compromised; the classic 
instance is Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (holding that “where a group of 
persons are . . . engaged in the use of firearms, and two of them are negligent in firing 
in the direction of a third person who is injured thereby, both . . . are liable for the 
injury . . . although the negligence of only one of them could have caused [it]”). See also 
the DES (diethylstilbestrol) cases: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937 
(Cal. 1980) (holding that “[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the 
judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could 
not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries”), and, most striking of all, 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (1989) (holding that “there should 
be no exculpation of a defendant who, although a member of the market producing 
DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff’s injury”). 
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marks, battered wives; experts on PCBs,9 paternity, poisons, 
post-traumatic stress; experts on radon, recovered memories, 
rape trauma syndrome, random-match probabilities; experts  
on psychosis, asbestosis, silicosis (and for all I know, on 
psittacosis!).10 There’s no question that the testimony of 
scientific experts is often essential, or that it can be enormously 
useful; but there’s also little question that these interactions 
between science and the legal system can be quite problematic.  
The announcement of this conference invites 
participants to consider “if and how [the inquiry into the 
reliability of proffered scientific testimony mandated by 
Daubert] relates to ‘truth’ and whose view of the truth should 
prevail.” I’m not entirely sure what to make of this, especially 
of those scare quotes around “truth.” Could they be an 
expression of skepticism, in the fashion of the post-modernists, 
about the legitimacy of the very concept of truth?11 Or are  
they perhaps an implicit endorsement of the strong forms of 
social constructivism fashionable among some practitioners of 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (“SSK”), Science and 
Technology Studies (“STS”), “ethnomethodology of science,” and 
other related fields?12 Or might they be just a way of conveying 
the modest-enough idea that certain scientific claims come to 
be thought of as true, not as a result of scientific investigation, 
but by becoming entrenched in legal decisions?  
In any case, I hope the account of truth in the sciences 
offered here will be on point. It will combine a full 
acknowledgment of the fallibility and incompleteness of the 
scientific enterprise with a robustly objective conception of 
  
 9 Polychlorinated biphenals, the highly toxic substance at issue in General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
 10 The list is taken from another earlier paper of mine: Susan Haack, What’s 
Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology, presented at 
the Coronado III Conference organized by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and 
Public Policy (SKAPP) in 2006 (forthcoming in Seton Hall Law Review), available at 
http://www.defendingscience.org/coronado_conference_papers/upload/Haack_Litigation. 
 11 I don’t believe such skepticism is warranted. See Susan Haack, Staying for 
an Answer: The Untidy Process of Groping for Truth, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 
July 9, 1999, at 12, reprinted in SUSAN HAACK, PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK: 
INQUIRY AND ITS PLACE IN CULTURE: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE, RELIGION, LAW, LITERATURE, 
AND LIFE (forthcoming) (Prometheus Books 2008); Susan Haack, The Unity of Truth 
and the Plurality of Truths, 9 PRINCIPIA 87 (2005), reprinted in HAACK, PUTTING 
PHILOSOPHY TO WORK, supra. 
 12 As this suggests, there are stronger and weaker forms of social 
constructivism, some (in my opinion) true but not very exciting, others exciting but 
false. They are distinguished and disentangled in SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING 
SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 190-91 (2003). 
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truth. It will, in consequence, be distinctly inhospitable both to 
fashionable forms of skepticism about the very idea of truth, 
and to strong forms of social constructivism about the sciences. 
But its combination of fallibilism and objectivity will help us 
understand why the legal system often gets less than the best 
out of science, shed some light on the vagaries of the legal use 
of the word “reliable,” and clarify the process by which 
scientific claims, true or false, can become legally entrenched 
as (supposedly) reliable science. 
The first step (Section II) is to sketch the legal history 
leading up to Daubert, and to explore some of the difficulties 
Daubert brought in its wake; the next (Section III) to develop 
an account of truth in the sciences; then (Section IV) to 
articulate why the legal system so often fails to get the best 
scientific information available; and finally (Section V) to show 
how false scientific claims sometimes get legally entrenched as 
reliable science.  
II.  A LEGAL TANGLE: FROM FRYE TO DAUBERT TO KUMHO 
TIRE TO REVISED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 
Ever since the legal system began to call on scientific 
witnesses, there have been complaints both from legal 
commentators and from scientists themselves about the defects 
and drawbacks of the process. Judges, attorneys, and legal 
scholars complain about the venality of scientists willing to 
testify to just about anything for money, about the naiveté of 
scientists who apparently don’t think concerns about conflict of 
interest apply to them,13 and so forth; scientists complain about 
judges’, jurors’, and attorneys’ ignorance and credulity on 
scientific matters, about the professional insult of being 
“Dauberted” or “dauberted out,”14 and so on. And while for 
  
 13 See, e.g., Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858) 
(“Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may 
be obtained to any amount.”); Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and 
Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1910) (“[T]here is a constant complaining and 
mistrust on the part of judges, juries and lawyers of the expert witness.”).  
 14 The phrase, once heard mainly in conversation, has entered the literature: 
“A ‘dauberted out’ economic expert in injury and wrongful death cases can be 
particularly disastrous.” LostCompensation.com, De-Daubertizing Economic Damages 
Evidence, http://www.lostcompensation.com/newsletters/v3_i1_2006.html (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2007). “A witness is said to be ‘Dauberted’ if excluded from testifying. Being 
‘dauberted out’ may make scientists even less willing to testify.” Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Legal Standards for Expert Testimony, CIVIL ACTION, Spring 2006,  
at 5, http://www.vis-res.com/pdf/Civil-Action-Spring2006.pdf (excerpted from a speech 
 
2008] OF TRUTH, IN SCIENCE AND IN LAW 989 
 
many decades now, from Frye (1923)15 to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (“FRE”) (1975) to Daubert (1993)16 and beyond, there 
have been legal efforts to domesticate scientific testimony by 
means of rules of evidence, these efforts have hardly been an 
unqualified success. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert, with its many 
ambiguities and confusions, is emblematic of the difficulties. 
The core of the Daubert ruling is that FRE 702, according to 
which the testimony of a qualified expert is admissible 
provided it is relevant and not otherwise legally excluded, 
supersedes the old Frye Rule,17 according to which novel 
scientific testimony is admissible only if it is “sufficiently 
established to be generally accepted in the field to which it 
belongs.”18 But the Daubert ruling goes on to explain that 
courts should screen proffered expert testimony for reliability 
as well as relevance.19 Moreover, the intended meaning of 
“reliable,” in the specialized, “evidentiary” sense Justice 
Blackmun gives it, and its relation to our ordinary notions of 
reliability, remains far from transparent. 
Courts are to assess reliability, Justice Blackmun 
continues, by determining whether proffered expert evidence is 
genuinely “scientific . . . knowledge,”20 and this determination is 
to be focused on experts’ methodology, not their conclusions. He 
seems to run “reliable” together with “scientific,” and 
“genuinely scientific” with “conducted in accordance with the 
scientific method” (elisions perhaps aided and abetted by his 
conflation of Karl Popper’s and Carl Hempel’s incompatible 
philosophies of science).21 The reference to “peer review and 
publication” in his list of indicia of reliability veers unsteadily 
between suggesting that courts determine whether the science 
  
presented at the Arthur M. Sackler Colloquia of the National Academy of Sciences 
(Nov. 17, 2005)). 
 15 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 16 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 17 Id. at 589. 
 18 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 20 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 590 n.8. This is the Court’s interpretation of the 
1975 Federal Rule of Evidence 702; but as the ellipses indicate, Justice Blackmun 
omits several words from the text of the Rule, which spoke of “scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975). 
 21 For more detailed discussion, see Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The 
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66 (2005), reprinted in 
41 INT’L SOC’Y BARRISTERS Q. 376 (2006), and HAACK, PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK, 
supra note 11. 
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on which proffered testimony is based has survived the pre-
publication peer-review process of the scientific journals, and 
suggesting that courts determine whether it has survived (or 
will survive?) the long-run scrutiny of the relevant scientific 
community.22 And so on.  
Moreover, while the ostensible intent of the Daubert 
ruling was to relax the “austere standard” of the older Frye rule 
in accordance with FRE 702—a point that states that decided 
to stick with Frye sometimes emphasize23—it is far from clear 
that this has really been its effect. Though a 2001 study from 
the RAND Institute for Civil Justice indicated that the full 
story may be more complicated than this,24 commentators often 
suggest that on the whole, at least in civil cases, Daubert has 
made it harder, not easier, to get scientific testimony 
admitted.25 
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has twice returned to 
the question of scientific testimony, first in Joiner (1997)26 and 
  
 22 For more detailed discussion, see Susan Haack, Peer Review and 
Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789 (2007). 
 23 E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994) (declining to adopt 
Daubert on the grounds that “Kelly sets forth the various reasons why the more 
‘conservative’ Frye approach . . . [is] an appropriate one”) (referring to People v. Kelly, 
549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976)); Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) (“Despite 
the federal adoption of a more lenient standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated 
by Frye.” (citation and footnote omitted)); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 
1, 3 (Pa. 2000) (while the Blums’ expert testimony was arguably admissible under “the 
somewhat less exacting standard of Daubert,” it was inadmissible under the Frye 
Rule); Olivier A. v. Christina A., No. 30779/2002, 2005 WL 2171176, at *24 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Aug. 25, 2005) (“The current controversy seeks to use Daubert to restrict and 
invalidate prior types of admissible evidence rather than expand what is admissible. 
This is inapposite . . . .”). 
 24 The study, based on data from 399 federal district court opinions in civil 
cases between 1980 and 1999, found that in the years immediately following Daubert 
judges scrutinized reliability more carefully, applied stricter standards, excluded more 
evidence, and issued more summary judgments; but that after about 1996 the rate of 
successful challenges began to fall, in part, they conjecture, because the parties 
responded to the changes in standards. LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE 
DAUBERT DECISION 7-8, 22-27 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 2001).  
 25 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 68 (2006) 
(arguing that “[t]he [Daubert] Court’s casually offered guidelines on admitting expert 
scientific evidence have served as the vehicle for transforming Daubert from an 
evidence-liberalizing decision into an evidence-narrowing one”); The Changing Role of 
Judges in the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, CIVIL ACTION, Spring 2006, at 1, 3, 
http://www.vis-res.com/pdf/Civil-Action-Spring2006.pdf (reporting that “[t]he study [of 
product liability filings in the Delaware Superior Court] shows that the failure to 
‘survive’ the Daubert challenge is contributing to the Vanishing Trial”).  
 26 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
2008] OF TRUTH, IN SCIENCE AND IN LAW 991 
 
then in Kumho Tire (1999).27 In these later rulings, the Court 
seems to have backed quietly away from some of the Daubert 
Court’s more ambitious philosophical observations: Justice 
Rehnquist’s ruling in Joiner suggests that the distinction 
between methodology and conclusions stressed in Daubert  
may be less than robust;28 Justice Breyer’s ruling in Kumho 
Tire insists that when FRE 702 refers to “scientific or other 
technical knowledge” the key word is “knowledge,” not 
“scientific.”29 But these later rulings hardly solved all the old 
problems; and they introduced new problems of their own. 
Joiner, confirming that evidentiary rulings under Daubert are 
reviewable only for abuse of discretion,30 brings the possibility 
to the fore that different courts in the same jurisdiction may 
rule inconsistently on the admissibility of the very same 
evidence. Kumho Tire, confirming that Daubert applies to non-
scientific as well as to scientific expert testimony, and that 
courts may use any, all, or none of the Daubert factors, or such 
other factors of their own devising as they deem appropriate,31 
leaves courts with startlingly little substantive guidance.  
In December 2000, FRE 702 was modified to make 
courts’ obligation to screen proffered expert testimony for 
reliability explicit: to be admissible, expert testimony must be 
based on “sufficient” data, the result of “reliable” methods, 
“reliably [applied] to the facts of the case.”32 With its stress on 
the need for courts to determine the reliability both of the 
underlying data and of its application to the case at issue, this 
revision went somewhat beyond simply articulating what, 
according to the Daubert Court, was already implicit in the 
original Rule 702; and some courts have understood the revised 
Rule as having tightened the Daubert standard.33 Still, however 
often the word “reliable” and its cognates are repeated, it is 
  
 27 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 28 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
 29 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147. Surprisingly, Justice Breyer suggests that this 
was already clear in Daubert. Id. at 147-48. 
 30 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143 (“[T]he question of admissibility of expert 
testimony . . . is reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard”). 
 31 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141 (“Daubert’s general holding . . . applies not only to 
testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and 
‘other specialized’ knowledge. . . . But . . . Daubert’s list of specific factors neither 
necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”). 
 32 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000) (and FED. R. EVID. 702 (2006)). 
 33 See, e.g., Rudd v. General Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (M.D. 
Ala. 2001) (“[T]he new Rule 702 appears to require a trial judge to make an evaluation 
that delves more into the facts than was recommended in Daubert . . . .”).  
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hard to see how any such verbal formula could, by itself, enable 
courts to discriminate genuinely reliable testimony from the 
unreliable stuff.  
Even after all these legal efforts, I suspect, no one 
believes that the legal system always gets the most or the best 
scientific information that, ideally, it might. This, however, 
presupposes that there are more and less reliable scientific 
claims, and that scientific claims are (normally) either objec-
tively true or else objectively false. But this presupposition 
stands in need of more detailed articulation and more careful 
argument. 
III.  TRUTH IN SCIENCE: THE CRITICAL COMMON-SENSIST 
PERSPECTIVE34 
The word “truth” is sometimes used as an abstract 
noun, referring to the concept of truth (or as some would prefer 
to say, to the property of being true, or to the meaning of the 
word “true” and its synonyms in other languages).35 The word is 
often also used, however, to refer to the particular propositions, 
etc., which are true; in this use it takes the plural form, as in: 
“we hold these truths to be self-evident . . . .”36  
People also write (or, “drawing” the quotation marks in 
the air with their fingers, speak) of “ ‘truth,’ ”  and “ ‘truths.’ ”  In 
this use, quotation marks signal doubts, reservations, or 
outright skepticism about the propriety of the word or phrase 
they enclose, and are known in the jargon of philosophers as 
scare quotes. Their effect is, roughly, to turn a term meaning 
“X” into a term meaning “so-called ‘X’.”  So “truths” means  
“so-called ‘truths’”  or “purported truths,” that is, propositions 
  
 34 “Critical common-sensism” (a phrase borrowed from C.S. Peirce) is my 
name for the philosophy of science offered in HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN 
REASON, supra note 12, on which I shall draw throughout this section.  
 35 Though I write here of “the property of being true,” I do not mean to 
foreclose questions in the philosophy of logic about whether “true” really is a predicate, 
really does represent a property, or whether it is, as Frank Ramsey suggested, 
something more like a sentential quantifier. See generally FRANK PLUMPTON RAMSEY, 
ON TRUTH: ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS (1927-1929) FROM THE RAMSEY 
COLLECTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH (Nicholas Rescher & Ulrich Majer 
eds., 1991); María-José Frápolli, The Logical Enquiry into Truth, 17 HIST. & PHIL. 
LOGIC 179 (1996); Susan Haack, The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths, supra 
note 11, at 90-91.  
 36 Though I write here of the truth (and falsity) of propositions (and later of 
the truth (and falsity) of claims, theories, etc.), I do not mean to foreclose issues about 
the precise nature of the truth-bearers, a topic long debated in philosophy of logic. See 
SUSAN HAACK, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICS 74-85 (1978). 
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which are taken to be or presented as truths; but conveys the 
suggestion that they may not really be true. And “truth” means 
“so-called ‘truth,’ ”  that is, the supposed concept of truth or 
property of being true; but conveys the suggestion that the 
concept may not really be a legitimate one. 
This much, though seldom spelled out explicitly,37 is not 
very controversial; now we get to the controversial part, for as 
the philosopher Nicholas Rescher once observed, “If two people 
agree, one of them isn’t a philosopher.”38 What I offer here is 
not “the philosophical perspective” on truth in the sciences; it is 
my philosophical perspective on truth in the sciences. But it is 
not (as I see it!) just one perspective on an equal footing with 
any other; for that it is my perspective means precisely that 
this is the conception I believe to be correct. I have no 
reservations about the legitimacy of the concept of truth, and 
so, where appropriate, will speak without apology of truth, not 
“truth.” However, I also have no doubt that propositions are 
often taken for true which are in fact false, that is, are only 
“truths,” not truths.  
I should add that what I offer here is not an account of 
scientific truth, if that is taken to imply that “true” has a 
special, distinctive meaning when applied to scientific 
propositions. My observations about the concept of truth are 
intended to apply to the truth not only of claims and theories in 
the sciences, but also to the truth of propositions of other kinds.  
As I see it, the terms “science” and “the sciences” are 
best construed as referring to a loose federation of kinds of 
inquiry, roughly characterizable by the questions within their 
scope. A large range of factual questions, including questions 
about the consequences of putting this or that policy into effect 
or about the risks and benefits of a drug, fall within the scope 
of one (or sometimes more than one) of the various, ramifying 
branches of science; but questions about whether this or that 
policy is preferable, or whether the risks outweigh the benefits, 
are not themselves scientific questions. This is not to suggest 
that the distinction is always perfectly clear; nor, more 
generally, that there is a clean, sharp line dividing scientific 
  
 37 The honorable exception is the now-classic critique of the deceptive power 
of scare quotes in D.C. STOVE, POPPER AND AFTER: FOUR MODERN IRRATIONALISTS 
(1982); reprinted under the title ANYTHING GOES: ORIGINS OF THE CULT OF SCIENTIFIC 
IRRATIONALISM (1998).  
 38 NICHOLAS RESCHER, THE STRIFE OF SYSTEMS: AN ESSAY ON THE GROUNDS 
AND IMPLICATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL DIVERSITY 3 (1985). 
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questions from others—cosmological from metaphysical ques-
tions, for example, or questions in theoretical psychology from 
questions in philosophy of mind.39 Nor is it to deny that, when 
scientific inquiry tackles old questions, it almost always raises 
new ones, and sometimes leads to the conclusion that an older 
question has no true or false answer, but is flawed by false 
presuppositions. 
The goal of scientific inquiry, as of any kind of inquiry, 
is to discover the answer to some question or questions; the 
true answer, that is.40 This is not to suggest that scientists seek 
THE TRUTH, in some quasi-religious sense (the sense, 
whatever it is, of Jesus’ claim that he is “the Way, the Truth, 
and the Light”); it is not to suggest that scientists collect true 
propositions, as some people collect rare stamps or antique 
furniture; and it is not to intimate that scientific truths are the 
only truths there are. But it is to say that the goal of an 
investigation into the structure of DNA is to reach the answer 
that DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out macromolecule with 
like-with-unlike base pairs if DNA is a double-helical, 
backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-unlike base pairs, 
or the answer that DNA is a triple-helical, backbone-in 
macromolecule with like-with-like base pairs if DNA is a triple-
helical, backbone-in macromolecule with like-with-like base 
pairs, . . ., or that it’s more complicated than that if it is more 
complicated than that; . . . and so on, mutatis mutandis, for 
other questions.  
This is fully in accordance with Aristotle’s dictum that 
“[t]o say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is 
false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it 
is not, is true”;41 and with Frank Ramsey’s laconic observation 
that “[a] belief that p . . . is true if and only if p; for instance, a 
  
 39 See also Susan Haack, Not Cynicism, But Synechism: Lessons from 
Classical Pragmatism, 41 TRANSACTIONS CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 239 (2005), 
reprinted in COMPANION TO PRAGMATISM 141 (John Shook & Joseph Margolis eds., 
2006) and in HAACK, PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK, supra note 11.  
 40 As this suggests, I accept neither an Instrumentalist view (according to 
which theoretical “statements” in science are not really genuine statements, and hence 
are neither true nor false), nor a Constructive Empiricist view (according to which, 
though theoretical statements are statements, and do have truth-values, the goal of 
science is empirical (observational) adequacy, not truth). I cannot argue either point 
here, but they are discussed in HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON, supra 
note 12, at 137-41.  
 41 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS Book IV, 7, 1011b25 (W.D. Ross trans., 
Clarendon Press 1924), reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 749 (Richard 
McKeon ed., 1941). 
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belief that Smith is either a liar or a fool is true if Smith is 
either a liar or a fool and not otherwise.”42 (This is “merely a 
truism,” Ramsey continues, needing to be stressed only because 
“there is no platitude so obvious that eminent philosophers 
have not denied it.”43) It is also enough to tell us that whether  
a scientific claim or theory is true or is false is normally an 
objective matter; that is, it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a proposition’s being true that you, or I, or anyone believe 
it.44 
To be sure, scientific claims and theories come into 
being as the result of scientists’ intellectual work; so in one 
sense scientists might be said to make scientific truths. But  
it is not scientists’ intellectual work, but the nature of the 
phenomena and events in the world that those claims and 
theories describe, that makes those scientific truths true. 
Natural-scientific claims and theories are about natural 
phenomena and events, and so (except in special cases 
involving phenomena and events that occur only in the 
laboratory) are about things not of our making; and while 
social-scientific claims and theories are about social 
phenomena, institutions, roles, rules, etc., which are of our 
making, whether those claims and theories are true or are  
false is still independent of whether you, or I, or anyone, thinks 
they are. 
So scientific claims and theories are (normally) either 
true or else false, and their truth or falsity is (normally) an 
objective matter. The objectivity of scientists, however, is 
another question, for the meaning of “objective” shifts 
somewhat when it is applied to persons. To say that not all 
scientists are objective means, first, that not all scientists are 
unemotional, stolid types; some are deeply engaged with and 
excited by their work. And second, most to the present purpose, 
it means that not all scientists are unbiased. A few scientists 
have been outright dishonest or fraudulent; many more, 
probably, are self-deceived on some matters and in some 
degree; most, almost certainly, have some preconceptions on 
  
 42 RAMSEY, supra note 35, at 12.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Of course, this falls well short of a complete theory of truth. I do not claim 
to have such a theory, but I have nibbled away at the problem in HAACK, PHILOSOPHY 
OF LOGICS, supra note 36, at 86-134; SUSAN HAACK, Confessions of an Old-Fashioned 
Prig, in MANIFESTO OF A PASSIONATE MODERATE: UNFASHIONABLE ESSAYS 7, 7-30 
(1998); Susan Haack, The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths, supra note 11. 
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some questions that make them less responsive to certain 
evidence than they should ideally be. 
The evidence with respect to scientific claims and 
theories is usually very complex, ramifying in every direction. 
It often depends on the reliable working of instruments of 
various kinds, or on the soundness of elaborate statistical 
techniques or computer programs; and it is almost always the 
work of many people—whether collaborators or rivals, and 
whether working together or many miles or decades apart—
who rely, explicitly or implicitly, on the competence and 
honesty of others involved. Evidence can be misleading, 
ambiguous, hard to interpret—and it is virtually always 
incomplete. Getting more evidence may be difficult, prohib-
itively expensive, or outright impossible in the current state of 
knowledge or technology; worse, it isn’t always clear even what 
additional evidence is needed (for whether this evidence is 
relevant to that claim depends on facts about the world, facts 
about which we may be mistaken).45 Whether or not they 
articulate it explicitly, most serious scientists have a firm-
enough grasp of the complexities of evidence; this is why, wary 
of claiming to have found the truth, they prefer to say, “this 
seems like a promising idea,” “this model seems to fit what we 
know so far,” “probably the value of c is approximately n,” 
“perhaps the explanation might be this,” “possibly, it’s this 
way,” and such. 
At any time there is a whole continuum of scientific 
ideas, claims, and theories: some so well-warranted by such 
strong evidence that it is most unlikely they will have to be 
revised; some not quite so well-warranted but still pretty 
solidly established; some promising but as yet far from certain; 
some new and exciting but highly speculative and as yet 
untested; and some so wild that few mainstream scientists are 
willing even to listen to them. (The proportion of the well-
warranted to the highly-speculative varies, obviously, across 
fields and sub-fields.) A few of the exciting but as yet untested 
ideas, and a very, very few of the wildest ideas, will eventually 
turn out to be warrantable, but most will not. A few of the now 
pretty-well-warranted ideas, and perhaps even a very, very few 
  
 45 Was I the only person in the country who didn’t laugh derisively at Donald 
Rumsfeld’s observations about those “unknown unknowns” in military intelligence? 
From a strictly epistemological point of view, this was an unusually sophisticated 
remark. 
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of the best-warranted ideas, will eventually be overturned by 
overwhelming contrary evidence, but most will not. 
There is no algorithmic scientific method guaranteeing 
success, or even progress. Rather, the many and various 
techniques and technologies the sciences have gradually 
devised—the instruments of observation, the cunningly devised 
experiments, the advanced mathematical and statistical 
techniques, the ever-fancier computer programs, etc.—have 
gradually made it possible to get more evidence, more exact 
evidence, and more focused evidence, and to work out the 
consequences of evidence, and assess its worth, more 
accurately. Nor are there “rules of acceptance and rejection” 
governing when a claim is well-enough warranted to be 
accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and when 
badly-enough undermined to be rejected. Rather, virtually any 
scientific community will include some who are temperamen-
tally inclined to work patiently to modify and adapt an old idea 
in the light of awkward new evidence, and some who are 
temperamentally more disposed to move on, to start looking  
for a fresh approach. And as new evidence comes in, there will  
be ongoing shifts of opinion out of which—though it may  
take many years or even decades—consensus will eventually 
emerge.  
“Warrant” is an epistemological term of art:46 how 
warranted a claim is depends on how good the evidence with 
respect to that claim is. “Acceptance” and “consensus,” by 
contrast, are psycho-sociological terms, referring to scientists’ 
agreement on the correctness of this or that idea. Though 
doubtless individual scientists often hope to persuade others 
that their approach or their conjecture is the right one, 
scientific investigation is not an effort to reach consensus; it is, 
rather, an effort to answer the questions at issue. Consensus is 
ordinarily a byproduct that arises when enough members of the 
relevant scientific community come to see the evidence as 
warranting a claim or a theory.  
As the previous paragraph suggests, warrant and 
consensus would, ideally, be tightly correlated: as the evidence 
favorable to a claim gets stronger, more scientists in the field 
will be inclined to accept it, or will be inclined to accept it  
more firmly; and as the evidence against a claim gets stronger, 
  
 46 “Epistemology” (from the Greek, episteme, “knowledge”) refers to the field 
of philosophical investigation focused on such concepts as knowledge, evidence, 
warrant, justification, inquiry, method, and intellectual character.  
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more scientists in the field will be inclined to reject it, or to 
reject it more confidently. At any time, there will be many 
scientific questions with respect to which the available 
evidence is still incomplete or ambiguous enough to leave room 
for legitimate disagreement among competent specialists  
about whether this account or that is more likely right, or even 
about whether any conclusion at all can be drawn on the basis 
of the evidence thus far. As more and stronger evidence comes 
in, however, more will be persuaded, until the former skeptics 
are convinced (or perhaps marginalized, or retired), and 
consensus solidifies.  
This seems to have been pretty much what happened, 
for example, with James Watson and Francis Crick’s model for 
the structure of DNA—where, by Crick’s reckoning, it took 
about 30 years, and a lot more evidence than they had in 1953, 
before theirs became the standard, well-accepted view.47 But 
there is no guarantee that warrant and acceptance will always 
run in parallel; for the process by which bad ideas and false 
theories get filtered out and rejected, and good ideas get 
established and accepted, is fallible, untidy, and ragged. Nor, of 
course, is there any guarantee that all the scientific claims 
accepted as true at any time are true; almost certainly, some 
will eventually turn out to have been, not truths, but only 
“truths.”  
Given the investigative character of the scientific 
enterprise and the pervasive reliance of individual scientists on 
evidence discovered by others, the core values are honesty 
(both with yourself and with other people) about what the 
evidence is and where it leads, and willingness to share 
evidence unreservedly with other investigators.48 Along with its 
constantly evolving ways of acquiring and appraising evidence, 
the scientific community has found ways to sustain commit-
ment to these core epistemological values. This has been a 
matter less of regulation than of ethos: ideally, the values of 
honesty and evidence-sharing will be instilled in young 
  
 47 FRANCIS CRICK, WHAT MAD PURSUIT? A PERSONAL VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY 71 (1988). 
 48 My terminology is new, and I hope less potentially confusing; but these 
terms correspond approximately to what Robert Merton called the norms of 
“disinterestedness” and “communism.” ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE 307-16 (1949); see also Susan Haack, The Integrity of Science: What It 
Means, Why It Matters, Ética e Investigacão nas Ciências da Vida, Actas do 10o 
Seminário de Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida, 9 (2007), reprinted 
in PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK, supra note 11. 
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scientists in the course of their long apprenticeship, and will  
be sustained by the incentive of renown for successful work  
and the disincentive of loss of reputation for cheating, by 
conscientious peer review at journals and grant-giving bodies, 
and by the commitment of the universities to a culture of 
investigation. So long as these social mechanisms work 
tolerably well, dishonest or sloppy work will be discouraged or, 
at worst, will be detected and discarded—not always, but at 
least when it is significant enough scientifically that, sooner or 
later, someone thinks it worth his while to try to build on it. 
But the social mechanisms that sustain commitment  
to the core epistemological values of the scientific enterprise 
are far more fallible and fragile than the technical helps  
to scientific inquiry—that is, the instruments, computer 
programs, and such. These social mechanisms are especially 
susceptible to pressures from the competing values of the 
society in which scientific work is undertaken: the commercial 
values of industrial sponsors of science, for example, or  
the ideological or political values of government sponsors. 
Presently, moreover, they are under such strain from changes 
in science funding, changes in the universities, changes at the 
scientific and medical journals, etc., that the integrity of 
science is in some danger of erosion.49  
The pressure of competing values is not felt evenly, but 
is more severe in some areas of science than others; and it is 
most severe, probably, in certain areas of the sciences, the 
biomedical sciences in particular, on which the legal system 
very often finds itself calling. This, as we shall see, is one of 
many reasons why the science that enters the legal system so 
often disappoints us.  
IV.  SCIENCE IN THE BRAMBLE PATCH  
 “One of many reasons”—almost too many, and too 
untidily intermingled, to list; but I will do my best.  
The first thing to stress, though, is that the enterprise 
to which we refer by the commodious word “science” is 
enormously complex, and uneven both in character and in 
quality. “Science” encompasses some of the most remarkable 
achievements of the human mind, some near-miracles of 
  
 49 See HAACK, The Integrity of Science, supra note 48. 
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“patience and postponement, [of] choking down of preference”50 
as those heroes of the history of science have figured out this or 
that aspect of the world, and a good deal more routine but solid 
and significant investigation. But it also includes plenty of 
(sometimes far-fetched) speculation; and, as with everything 
human, much that is lazy, sloppy, corner-cutting, self-
promoting, or self-deceptive, and some that is flaky or even 
fraudulent. Moreover, the scientific enterprise—complex, 
ragged, fallible, fumbling, but thus far remarkably successful, 
as human enterprises go—operates within the larger society on 
which it relies for resources, and is vulnerable to pressures to 
conform to commercial, ideological, etc., values at odds with its 
own core epistemological norms.  
Against this background, it isn’t hard to see why the 
legal system has had difficulties in handling scientific 
testimony. It often calls on the weaker areas of science and/or 
on weak or marginal scientists in an area; moreover, its 
adversarial character may mean that even solid scientific 
information gets distorted; it may suppress or sequester 
relevant data; it may demand scientific answers when none are 
yet well-warranted; it may fumble in applying general scientific 
findings to specific cases; and it may fail to adapt appropriately 
as a relevant scientific field progresses. Let me take these 
points in turn. 
Much of the scientific work on which the law calls comes 
from weaker or less mature sciences or fields of science.51 Some 
comes from fields the market for which is largely, if not 
exclusively, created by the legal system itself: for example, 
psychiatric theorizing about (purportedly) recovered memories, 
surely at the weaker end of the social, or as we sometimes say, 
the “soft” sciences; and forms of forensic identification, such as 
latent fingerprint identification, about the reliability of which 
much is claimed, but remarkably little seems to be known.52 
  
 50 WILLIAM JAMES, The Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER 
ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 1, 7 (Dover 1956) (1897). 
 51 And, as Justice Breyer observes, general acceptance in a discipline is little 
assurance of reliability if the discipline in question is weak or dubious. Kumho, 526 
U.S. at 151. 
 52 See, e.g., Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, ISSUES IN 
SCI. & TECH., Fall 2003, at 47; Sharon Begley, Despite Its Reputation, Fingerprint 
Evidence Isn’t Really Infallible, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at B1; Simon A. Cole, 
Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera 
Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1191-1208 (2004); Simon A. Cole, 
Does “Yes” Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close Debate on the Admissibility of 
Fingerprint Evidence, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449, 453-58 (2005); Simon A. Cole, Is 
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Even when the science crucial to litigation comes from 
relatively stronger scientific fields where there is a substantial 
body of well-established knowledge, these are quite often the 
very areas of science where scientists’ commitment to the 
norms of honesty and evidence-sharing is most sorely tried—
making it more likely that awkward evidence will be withheld, 
or “spun” to reach a desired conclusion. The scientific evidence 
in toxic tort litigation, for example, often hinges on 
epidemiological studies undertaken by defendant manufac-
turers, whether for the purpose of obtaining Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approval or in anticipation of the 
possibility of such litigation. Sometimes such studies are 
designed to make it more likely that they will detect favorable 
data than that they will detect unwelcome trends.53  
Moreover, even when the relevant areas of science are 
relatively solid and respectable, the scientific issues in 
litigation tend to turn not on firmly-established, well-
warranted core scientific principles, but on still-controversial 
scientific issues where there remains room for reasonable 
disagreement even among competent, honest scientists in the 
field. The better established it is that this substance is 
harmless and inert in the human body, for example, the less 
likely it is that it will be the subject of toxic tort litigation, and 
the better established it is that it is dangerous to humans, the 
likelier that cases will be settled; the better established it is 
that this technique of forensic identification is bullet-proof, the 
likelier that cases will be pled out.  
And because of its adversarial character, the legal 
system tends to pull in scientists from the farther ends of the 
spectrum of scientific opinion: those ready to give a confident 
answer before others think any answer is warranted, those 
more scientifically radical, or more scientifically conservative, 
than most of their colleagues, those whose views have become 
  
Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ 
Discourse, 28 LAW & POL’Y 109, 109-10 (2006). Fingerprints first acquired their 
supposedly authoritative status, apparently, when English police found they could 
elicit confessions by confronting suspects with this damning evidence against them. 
Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of 
Latent Fingerprint Identification, SCI. IN CONTEXT, Spring 1999, at 139, 151. 
 53 For example, the first large clinical trial of Vioxx, the VIGOR trial, 
conducted by Merck scientists, continued to track gastrointestinal effects (anticipated 
to be favorable) after it stopped tracking cardiovascular effects (anticipated to be 
unfavorable). See HAACK, The Integrity of Science, supra note 48; David Armstrong, 
Bitter Pill: How the New England Journal Missed Warning Signs on Vioxx, WALL ST. 
J., May 15, 2006, at A1. 
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dogmatically entrenched in the course of their involvement in 
the litigation process—and, no doubt, a few outright cranks 
and a few outright whores.54 Even when a scientific question is 
regarded by most people in the relevant scientific community 
as pretty well-settled, attorneys for the parties to a suit are 
motivated to seek out as expert witnesses those scientists who 
still have reservations on the matter. And even when a 
question is still within the realm of reasonable scientific 
disagreement, the attorneys are motivated to seek out those 
scientists who are already most firmly convinced one way or 
the other. As a result, the legal process can sometimes create 
spurious, artificial scientific certainty, and spurious, artificial 
scientific doubt.55  
Moreover, because advocates will try to get evidence 
unfavorable to their case excluded, and because settlements 
may require confidentiality, the adversarial system can 
contribute to scientific secrecy (withholding evidence) as well 
as spin (distorting evidence). Not surprisingly, also, when 
scientific developments attract the attention of the legal 
community, researchers may find their work interrupted by 
subpoenas and depositions, and sometimes attacked, as 
attorneys seek to discredit it.56  
Because they are specific to a particular case or 
individual, the questions to which the legal system needs 
answers are rarely exactly the questions on which the relevant 
scientific work would ordinarily focus.57 There may, for 
  
 54 It has also been suggested that the unappealing possibility of being 
Dauberted out makes some scientists, including some of those one would like to have 
involved, reluctant to participate in legal disputes. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 25, 
at 75-77. 
 55 See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty: 
Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment, 95 (Supp. 
1) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S39 (2005). 
 56 See, e.g., Catharine Arnst, Keeping Lawyers Out of the Lab: Researchers 
Gripe that Suits Arising from Their Findings Waste Time and Hurt Their Reputations, 
4020 BUS. WK., Feb. 5, 2007, at 54 (reporting that “[s]cientists who would prefer to plug 
away quietly in their labs say they are dragged into lawsuits the moment their 
research turns up a hint of the possible cause of a disease”).  
 57 This may in part explain, for example, why despite the fact that the 
dangers of PCBs were already so well known that the stuff had been banned for 
decades, General Electric was able successfully to defend itself against Mr. Joiner’s 
claim. Precisely because PCBs had long been banned, there were no large, directly 
relevant epidemiological studies on which Mr. Joiner’s attorneys could rely; and GE’s 
attorneys could suggest other, arguably more plausible, explanations of what caused 
him to develop an aggressive lung cancer at an early age. See Michael Gottesman, 
From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 
766-69 (1998). (Mr. Gottesman represented both the Dauberts and the Joiners at the 
Supreme Court.)  
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example, be solid scientific work on the distribution of a disease 
or disorder in the population as a whole, and reasonable 
theories about its etiology, but there is unlikely to be scientific 
work directly relevant to whether this risk factor was a 
significant cause of this person’s contracting the disease.58 Or, 
as in the case of forensic identification by DNA, where the 
relevant science is very well-warranted indeed, its application 
to the samples from this crime scene and this defendant 
introduces a whole raft of opportunities for corner-cutting, 
sloppiness, self-deception, and plain dishonesty.  
The very structure of evidence law can create further 
problems. The evidence that warrants a scientific claim is 
likely to include a complex mesh of interlocking reasons, none 
of which by itself would be sufficient to warrant the claim. 
(This is not to suggest, as some proponents of “weight of 
evidence methodology” seem to think, that the combined weight 
of evidence can be assessed by some mechanical formula; it is 
only to say that, where many lines of evidence interlock in the 
right way, they may jointly warrant a claim even though none 
would do so by itself.)59 But courts screening expert scientific 
testimony will determine, for each proffered witness, whether 
his testimony is admissible, and often on what specific matters 
he may offer an opinion. This may mean that even when there 
  
 58 When Daubert was remanded to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski ruled 
the plaintiffs’ expert epidemiological testimony inadmissible, finding (1) that 
“California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin increased the 
likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than not caused their injuries”; and (2) that  
[i]n terms of statistical proof, this means that plaintiffs must establish not 
just that their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat the 
likelihood of birth defects, but that it more than doubled it—only then can it 
be said that Bendectin is more likely than not the cause of their injury. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (1995). Judge Kozinski cited 
Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456, 460 (1985) (requiring that it be “more 
likely than not” that the injury was caused by defendant’s action or product) and 
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he relative 
risk of limb reduction defects arising from the epidemiological data [Dr.] Done relies 
upon will . . . have to exceed ‘2’.”). (I note, however, that there is no reference in Jones 
to a doubling of the risk; and that in DeLuca, where there is, the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for Merrell Dow, 
which had been based on its exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Alan Done that 
Bendectin did double the risk of limb reduction. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 959.) 
 59 See Susan Haack, An Epistemologist Among the Epidemiologists, 15 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 521 (2004), reprinted in PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK, supra note 11. 
Cf. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1986) (“Like the 
pieces of a mosaic, the individual studies showed little or nothing when viewed 
separately . . . but they combined to produce a whole that was greater than the sum of 
its parts: a foundation for Dr. Done’s opinion that Bendectin caused appellant’s birth 
defects.”). 
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is a congeries of evidence which, taken together, strongly 
suggests that exposure to this substance is causally related to 
that disease or disorder, the rules of evidence may preclude its 
admissibility because no individual component, by itself, is 
deemed to meet the Daubert standard of reliability.60 
Not only does the legal system quite often want 
scientific answers when no warranted answers are available, it 
also quite often fails to adapt, or adapts painfully slowly, as 
new scientific answers become available. The law looks to 
precedent, and courts sometimes continue to follow earlier 
rulings based on now-superseded science. In Texas death-
penalty sentencing hearings, for example, courts continue to 
rely on psychiatric or “soft” social-scientific testimony as to the 
likelihood that a defendant convicted of first-degree murder 
will be dangerous in future—even though (somewhat) more 
accurate actuarial methods of prediction are now available.61  
It is no mystery, then, why the law often gets less than 
the best out of science. But one more task remains: to explain 
how scientific claims that are not true are sometimes 
transmuted into legal truths. 
V.  HOW SCIENTIFIC “TRUTHS” GET ENTRENCHED AS 
LEGALLY RELIABLE 
“True” has the same meaning when it is applied to legal 
propositions as it does when applied to propositions of other 
kinds. It is true that domestic cats are related to tigers if and 
only if domestic cats are related to tigers; similarly, it is true 
that Florida law in 2007 requires that novel scientific 
testimony be “sufficiently established to be generally accepted 
in the field to which it belongs,” if and only if Florida law in 
2007 does require that novel scientific testimony be sufficiently 
established to be generally accepted in the field to which it 
  
 60 The word that came to my mind when I noticed this problem is “atomism.” 
But see Thomas O. McGarity, Science in the Regulatory Process; On the Prospect of 
“Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 172-
78 (2003) (writing of “corpuscularism”).  
 61 See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of Future 
Dangerousness Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and 
Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV. 469, 485-89 (2004); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-
Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 301, 301-02. (I don’t mean to imply that 
the fact that a person convicted of murder will be dangerous in future is a reason to 
sentence him or her to death; but this is not the place to engage with that issue.)  
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belongs. However, such legal truths are not exactly like, say, 
the truths of physics, but are more like social-scientific truths.  
Truths to the effect that the law is thus and so have to 
be understood to be specific to a jurisdiction and to a time (as 
many truths about social institutions have to be understood to 
be specific to a society and a time). For example, in 2003 it was 
true that Michigan law required admissible scientific testimony 
to satisfy the Frye test, but since January 1, 2004, it has been 
true that Michigan law requires expert, including scientific, 
testimony to satisfy the Daubert requirements.62 Sometimes it 
is neither true nor false that the law in such-and-such a 
jurisdiction is thus and so; for example, until the Supreme 
Court settled the question in Daubert, it was neither true nor 
false that FRE 702 superseded the Frye Rule in federal courts. 
And what makes it true that the law in such-and-such a 
jurisdiction at such-and-such a time is thus and so is what 
legislators and courts do.63  
It is standard to distinguish statements of fact, such as 
“there was a stop sign at the intersection on the day of the 
accident,” from statements of law, such as “felony murder is an 
unlawful homicide occurring in the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony.” (It might, perhaps, be better to speak 
of statements of law versus statements of non-legal fact; but 
the more standard terminology will serve.) Usually, the 
intended distinction is straightforward enough, but there are 
significant borderline and mixed cases, one of which is directly 
to the present purpose. Questions about admissibility would be 
classified as questions of law, falling within the province of the 
court; questions about the weight of evidence would be 
classified as questions of fact, falling within the province of the 
jury. But rules about the admissibility of expert testimony have 
blurred this apparently simple dichotomy.  
Specifically, by requiring courts to screen proffered 
expert scientific testimony for reliability as well as relevance, 
and thus extending their preserve, Daubert has shifted some 
questions formerly conceived as concerning the weight of  
 
  
 62 See People v. Wright, No. 04-001187-FC, 2006 WL 2271264, at *5 (Mich. 
App. Aug. 8, 2006) (The defendant “argue[d] that [Leuco Crystal Violet] testing cannot 
pass the Davis-Frye ‘general acceptance’ standard.” However, “[Michigan Rule of 
Evidence] 702 was specifically amended, effective January 1, 2004, to incorporate the 
Daubert standards . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 63 See also Susan Haack, Truth, Truths, “Truth,” and “Truths” in the Law, 26 
HARV. J.L. &. PUB. POL’Y 17, 19-20 (2003). 
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evidence into the category of questions bearing on admissi-
bility.64 This is why attorneys sometimes complain that, since 
Daubert, they are in effect obliged to try their cases twice—first 
at an evidentiary hearing before the court, and then a second 
time before the jury; and why, if one party’s expert testimony is 
excluded, the case may well end in summary judgment against 
them. In short, the concept of evidentiary reliability seems to 
straddle the line between law and fact.  
Like the legal concepts of insanity, causation, or intoxi-
cation, the legal concept of reliability is at once closely related 
to, and yet importantly distinct from, ordinary, non-technical 
concepts. The legal concept of insanity isn’t exactly the same as 
everyday conceptions of madness, but isn’t entirely disjoint 
from them; the legal concept of causation isn’t exactly the same 
as everyday conceptions of cause, but isn’t entirely disjoint 
from them; the legal concept of intoxication isn’t exactly the 
same as everyday conceptions of drunkenness, but isn’t entirely 
disjoint from them; and similarly, the legal concept of 
reliability isn’t just the same as everyday understandings of 
reliability, but isn’t entirely disjoint from them, either.  
In fact, evidentiary reliability is a puzzling, Janus-faced 
concept. The doubleness is already close to the surface in 
Daubert, in that curious footnote where Justice Blackmun tells 
us that reliability, in the specifically legal sense he is articula-
ting, is not to be identified with “scientific reliability” (which he 
takes to mean that “application of the principle gives consistent 
results”), but corresponds to “scientific validity” (which he 
takes to mean that “the principle supports what it purports to 
show”). But then he goes on to assure us that evidentiary 
reliability is simply a matter of the “trustworthiness” of the 
testimony65—which, however, is surely significantly stronger 
than “the principle supports what it purports to show.”  
You might wonder what degree of reliability is required 
for expert testimony to be admissible.66 For in ordinary speech, 
  
 64 Under the Frye test, also, rulings on the admissibility of novel scientific 
testimony involve an element of fact; and commentators have expressed concern that 
Frye might, as Michael Graham puts it, set once-accepted science in “appellate 
concrete” and fail to adapt if the scientific community subsequently changes its mind in 
response to new evidence. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 
188, 232-33 (1983). But here I will focus on Daubert. 
 65 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
 66 See, e.g., Dale Nance, Two Concepts of Reliability, 3 APA NEWSL. ON PHIL. 
& L. (American Philosophical Ass’n) 123, 125-27 (2003); Haack, Peer Review and 
Publication, supra note 22. 
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though “reliable” has quite a tangle of uses, in all them—
whether we are speaking of inanimate objects such as watches 
or motor vehicles, or of persons, or of information, data-bases, 
etc.—it connotes something, fitness to be relied upon, that 
comes in degrees. But admissibility is not a matter of degree, 
which means that the Daubert ruling requires evidentiary 
reliability to be categorical.67 Most to the present point, though, 
the rationale for introducing the concept of evidentiary 
reliability depends crucially on its connection with the ordinary 
concept of reliability-as-trustworthiness; but qua legal concept 
evidentiary reliability simply requires that the testimony at 
issue satisfy certain legally specified conditions.68 There is, 
however, absolutely no guarantee that all, or only, testimony 
deemed by courts to meet the standards of evidentiary 
reliability is trustworthy, that is, is reliable in the ordinary 
sense of the word.69 
In Joiner, rejecting respondents’ (Joiner’s attorneys’) 
argument that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling excluding 
their proffered expert testimony should have been subject to 
especially stringent review, given that this exclusion was 
outcome-determinative, Justice Rehnquist writes: “On a motion 
for summary judgment disputed issues of fact are resolved 
against the moving party . . . . But the question of admissibility 
of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact . . . .”70 Here—
even though, had the evidence been admitted, its degree of 
reliability would have been a factual matter for the jury to 
determine—the question of evidentiary reliability is treated as 
a purely legal matter.  
Claims to the effect that this or that scientific evidence 
is legally reliable can be made true by legal decisions. 
  
 67 See, e.g., In re Paoli RR. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(observing that “[t]he evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits 
standard of correctness”); see also Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1998) (holding that social-scientific evidence should not be required to meet 
standards of reliability as high as those demanded for the admissibility of natural-
scientific testimony). 
 68 Conditions which, however, are significantly less precisely specified since 
Kumho. 
 69 Compare this, on the preponderance of evidence standard of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 104(a), from Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987): “The 
inquiry made by a court . . . is not whether the proponent of the evidence wins or loses 
his case on the merits, but whether the evidentiary Rules have been satisfied.”  
 70 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added); see also Heinzerling, Doubting 
Daubert, supra note 25, at 80 (arguing that Joiner makes evidentiary reliability a kind 
of legal chimera, neither an issue of fact to be decided in favor of the nonmoving party 
nor an issue of law subject to de novo review). 
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However—verbal appearances to the contrary—it doesn’t follow 
that scientific truths can be legally constructed. Legal truths 
are made true by legal decisions; and so, sometimes, are 
scientific “truths.” But it is the character of phenomena and 
events in the world that scientific propositions describe—not 
legal decisions about evidentiary reliability, and not arguments 
and cross-examination in court—that make true scientific 
propositions true, and false scientific propositions false. 
